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CHAPTER 1 0 
Criminal Law, Procedure and 
Administra tion 
SANFORD J. FOX 
§10.1. Crime in Massachusetts. Both the substantive criminal law 
and the compl,ex expensive machinery for its administration have as 
one of their primary goals the suppression of crime. Increases or de-
creases in crime over a period of time, therefore, provide some indi-
cations of the efficacy of law and administration.1 
The most reliable sources of information concerning the incidence 
of major crime in the Commonwealth are the Uniform Crime Reports 
published annually by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.2 Seven 
types of offenses are encompassed by the reports: murder and non-
negligent manslaughter,S forcible rape,4 robbery,5 aggravated assault,6 
burglary,7 larceny of over fifty dollars8 and auto theft.9 
SANFORD J. Fox is Assistant Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Ralph C. Good and John M. 
Silvaggi of the Board of Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§lO.l. 10f course, the incidence of crime can be traced to more than the opera-
tion of the criminal law. Religious and ethical training playa role in preventing 
crime. Similarly, economic forces as well as weaknesses in the law may precipitate 
crime. Nonetheless, society does look to the law for the preservation of peace and 
order. 
2 Information concerning other crimes is not available. The annual reports of 
the Commissioner of Correction include statistics for arrests and prosecutions of 
other crimes. E.g., 1957 Statistical Reports of the Commissioner of Correction, Pub. 
Doc. No. 115, at pp. 51-53, 80-81. But since there is no fixed relation between the 
amount of crime committed and the number of arrests or prosecutions these re-
ports do not shed any light upon the incidence of crime. The FBI publication de-
scribes the number of offenses known to the police. Considering the nature of 
these offenses, defined in notes 3-9 infra, it may be assumed that these represent a 
high proportion of the offenses actually committed. A bill, H. 286, was introduced 
in 1959 that would establish a Bureau of Criminal Statistics in the Department 
of the Attorney General. Enactment of such a law would help provide invaluable 
information to all concerned with the problem of crime. 
S This includes all criminal homicides except those caused by negligence. "Man-
slaughter by negligence includes any death which the police investigation establishes 
was primarily attributable to gross negligence on the part of some individual other 
than the victim." FBI, 1958 Uniform Crime Reports 17. 
4 Includes forcible rape, assault to rape and attempted rape. Ibid. Prior to 
1958 this category included statutory offenses where the victim was under the age 
of consent. Id. at 2. 
""Includes stealing or taking anything of value from the person by force or 
I 
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In the calendar year 1958 there were 37,484 major 
mitted in Massachusetts, compared to 34,920 in 1957. 
total for each offense is shown in Table I. 
offenses com-
The annual 
TAB L E 110 
Number of Major Offenses Committed in 
1957 and 195811 
Murder and 
Non-negligent Aggravated Larceny 
Manslaughter Robbery Assault Burglary over/50 
1957 62 950 753 13,594 8,790 
1958· 69 1,037 775 15,498 9,091 
Auto 
Theft 
10,771 
1l,014 
Relating this increase in the number of offenses to the increase in 
the population reveals that the total number of major offenses com-
mitted per one hundred thousand of population went from 723.4 in 
1957 to 771.0 in 1958, an increase in the rate of 6.6 percent. The high-
est increase in rate was shown for burglaries (up 13.2 percent over the 
1957 rate), while the lowest increase was recorded for auto thefts (up 
only 1.5 percent). Table II on the following page shows the change in 
rate for all offenses. 
For all major crimes the increase in rate for Massachusetts is slightly 
lower than the increase in rate for the country as a whole (6.6 percent 
compared to 7.4 percent). The Massachusetts increase is more than 
2 percent less than that shown for all of New England (8.8 percent).12 
Due to changes in the FBI's method of computing population, these 
comparisons cannot be carried back further than to 1957.13 A differ-
violence or by putting in fear, such as strong-arm robbery, stickups, robbery armed. 
Includes assault to rob and attempt to rob." Id. at 18. 
6 "Includes assault with intent to kill; assault by shooting, cutting, stabbing, 
maiming, poisoning, scalding or by the use of acids. Does not include simple as-
sault, assault and battery, fighting, etc." Ibid. 
1 "Includes burglary, housebreaking, safecracking, or any unlawful entry to com-
mit a felony or a theft, even though no force was used to gain entrance. Includes 
attempts. Burglary followed by larceny is included in this classification and not 
counted again as larceny." Ibid. 
8 Includes "any stealing of property or article of value (over $50) which is not 
taken by force and violence or by fraud. Does not include embezzlement, 'con' 
games, forgery, worthless checks, etc." Ibid. 
9 "Includes all cases where a motor vehicle is stolen or driven away and aban-
doned, including the so-called joy-riding thefts. Does not include taking for tem-
porary use when actually returned by the taker, or unauthorized use by those 
having lawful access to the vehicle." Ibid. 
10 Compiled from id. at 64-65. 
11 Since the content of the rape category was changed in 1958 this offense is not 
included in the comparison. However, in 1958 there were 217 forcible rapes in 
Massachusetts. Id. at 55. 
12 Id. at 64. 
13 Prior to the latest report, population was taken as that indicated by the last 
decennial census, with the result that as the next census time is approached the 
population figure becomes more and more inaccurate. Now annual estimates of 
population are made and used for computing the crime rate. For the factors that 
go into the estimate, see id. at 21·22. 
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ence in the crime rate from only one year to the next cannot provide 
the basis for identifying a trend. The dangers of generalization from 
such a narrow base of comparison are illustrated by the crime data 
for the first nine months of 1959 relating to cities in the Common-
wealth having populations of over one hundred thousand.14 Com-
parison of these figures with those for the first nine months of 1958 
for these cities indicates that, on the whole, the number of crimes is 
decreasing (14,631 for the first three quarters of 1958, 13,464 for the 
same period in 1959). The number of murders and non-negligent 
manslaughters has decreased (27 to 26); forcible rapes have increased 
(73 to 80); robberies have decreased (486 to 409); aggravated assaults 
have increased (437 to 582); burglaries have decreased (5005 to 4916); 
larcenies over fifty dollars have decreased (3378 to 2848); and auto 
thefts have decreased (5225 to 4603). 
TAB LEI 115 
Number of Major Offenses per One Hundred 
Thousand of Population: 1957 and 1958 
Murder and 
Non.negligent Aggravated Larceny Auto 
Manslaughter Robbery Assault Burglary over $50 Theft 
1957 1.3 19.7 15.6 281.6 182.1 223.1 
1958 1.4 21.3 15.9 318.8 187.0 226.5 
Rate In-
crease 7.7% 8.1% 1.9% 13.2% 2.7% 1.5% 
Whether this downward trend will persist for the Commonwealth 
as a whole and through the last quarter of 1959 will not be known 
until the next annual report is issued in the fall of 1960. The 1957, 
1958 and incomplete 1959 data are presented here primarily to provide 
a basis for determining true crime trends in future ANNUAL SURVEYS 
and to depict our present state. 
A. LEGISLATION 
§lO.2. Income taxes. Several new crimes have been created as part 
of the income tax enforcement system. Since 1955 a taxpayer who 
files a fraudulent return has been subject to criminal penalties. 1 The 
14 FBI. Uniform Crime Reporting. Release of Preliminary Data for the United 
States. January-September 1959. This report includes the city of Lynn. The coun-
terpart Preliminary Data report for January-September 1958 did not include Lynn. 
The comparisons in the text. therefore. are made only for the seven cities appearing 
in both reports: Boston. Cambridge. Fall River. New Bedford. Somerville. Spring. 
field and Worcester. Since both reports consist of only one page. no additional cita· 
tions are made for the figures in the text. 
15 Compiled from FBI. 1958 Uniform Crime Reports 64·65. 
§lO.2. 1 G.L.. c. 62. §56. as amended by Acts of 1955. c. 539. See 1955 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §16.6 at 176. 
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same criminal penalties have now been extended to whoever willfully 
assists in the filing or preparation of a fraudulent return, provided its 
fraudulent nature is known to him.2 A failure to pay over to the 
Commissioner any money received from another person for the purpose 
of discharging that other person's tax liability is also now subject to 
the same criminal penalties. No particular knowledge, purpose or 
intent is needed - the crime is in the fact of failure to pay.a 
New crimes have also been created as part of the scheme to collect 
income taxes through a system of withholding. A penalty of a $1000 
fine or imprisonment for one year is applicable to an employer who 
willfully fails to furnish his employee with a statement concerning 
the amount of taxes that have been deducted and withheld from 
wages.. Similarly, an employee who willfully fails to furnish his em-
ployer with a withholding exemption and deduction certificate, or 
who furnishes a false or fraudulent certificate, is punishable by a $500 
fine or imprisonment for one year.5 
Upon a failure to comply with certain of the withholding provisions 
an employer is required to deposit withheld taxes in a separate bank 
account.6 Failure to meet the deposit requirements subjects the em-
ployer to a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $5000 or by im-
prisonment for not more than one year.7 Certain defenses to this 
prosecution are set forth in the statute. The employer must prove 
that (1) there was a reasonable doubt as to whether a tax was required 
to be withheld, or (2) there was a reasonable doubt as to who was 
required to withhold the tax, or (3) the failure to comply with the 
deposit requirements was due to circumstances beyond the control of 
the employer. A lack of funds with which to make the deposit, how-
ever, does not bring the defaulting employer within the terms of this 
last defense.8 
§lO.3. Sexually dangerous persons. Early in the 1959 SURVEY year 
the Massachusetts statute dealing with sex offenders was replaced by 
one following a similar pattern in dealing with sexually dangerous 
persons. l Many of the changes introduced by the new act represent 
distinct improvements in the method of dealing with a complex and 
difficult problem. A few, unfortunately, do not. 
It should be stressed at the outset that neither the new act nor its 
predecessor always require the commission of a crime for its provisions 
to go into effect. Three classes of persons are eligible for treatment as 
sexually dangerous persons: (I) those who are convicted of designated 
2 Acts of 1959, c. 315. 
a Ibid • 
• Id., c. 17, §ll(c). 
5 Id. §ll(d). 
6 Id. §7(a), (b). 
7 Id. §7(d). 
8 Id. §7(e). 
510.3. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 646. 
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sex offenses;2 (2) those serving sentence in a jail, house of correction or 
prison3 (this class includes such diverse persons as those who have 
committed criminal homicide and those who have unreasonably be-
lieved they were not required to withhold an income tax4); and (3) 
those in the custody of the Youth Service Board 5 (this group includes 
delinquent and wayward children who may not have committed any 
offense at all 6). 
To some extent these statutes are a departure from the idea that the 
compulsive force of the state is to be applied to an individual when 
he has done something proscribed and represent some acceptance of 
the idea that the use of this force is justified when an individual has 
become something proscribed. 
A person must satisfy three definitional elements in order to be 
classed as sexually dangerous. These relate to past behavior, a present 
defect and a likelihood of future misbehavior. 
Past behavior. The statutory definition of a sexually dangerous 
person mentions three items of past behavior.7 The first is "miscon-
duct in sexual matters." There is no indication that this misconduct 
must amount to criminal misconduct. Nor is there anything to indi-
cate how much or what kind of sexual deviation will amount to "mis-
conduct." The former statute spoke of "a course of misconduct in 
sexual matters." 8 Under the new act merely one instance of "miscon-
duct" apparently is sufficient. The second and third items of past 
behavior are new to the statutory scheme. The second is "repetitive 
or compulsive behavior." The third is "violence or aggression by an 
adult against a victim under the age of sixteen years." 
The second requirement seems to cancel the change wrought by 
dropping the course of misconduct requirement of the former act_ 
That is, if there has been repetitive or compulsive behavior it is highly 
likely that there has been a course of misconduct in sexual matters. 
This would seem to be true unless the repetitive or compulsive be-
havior need not have been sexual behavior. 
The third item of past behavior seems to exempt from the provisions 
of the act those whose sexual activity is not accompanied by violence 
or whose appetites, violent or not, do not extend to young children. 
If this were an exemption from criminality for sexual deviation that 
is nonviolent and does not involve children, it could be understood 
2 Indecent assault or indecent assault and battery, indecent assault and battery 
on a child under the age of fourteen, rape, rape of a female child under sixteen, 
carnal knowledge and abuse of a female child under sixteen, assault with intent to 
commit rape, open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, unnatural and 
lascivious acts with another person or with a child under the age of sixteen, 
lewd, wanton and lascivious behavior or indecent exposure, or an attempt to com-
mit any of these crimes. Id_ §3. 
3 Id. §6. 
4 See the comment on this latter provision in §IO.2 supra. 
5 Acts of 1958, c. 646, §6 
6 "Delinquent child" and "wayward child" are defined in G.L., c. 119, §52. 
7 Acts of 1958, c. 646, §I. 
8 Acts of 1954, c. 686, §I. 
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to represent a legislative judgment that consent and maturity are 
sufficient to govern relations between persons in this area, and that the 
community need not be concerned when these two factors are present. 
There is no such exemption or judgment in the act, however. There-
fore, so long as such offenses as sodomy have no exception for con-
sensual adult commission, it is not clear why those who peacefully 
engage in them are not treated as sexually dangerous persons. In-
herent in the judgment that this kind of sexual behavior is criminal 
is the judgment that it poses a danger to the community. If there is 
not sufficient danger then the conduct ought not to be criminal in the 
first place. 
Present defect. The new act repeats the requirement of the old act 
that the past behavior must indicate a general lack of power to control 
sexual impulses. 
Future misbehavior. The last requirement for classification as a 
sexually dangerous person is a prognosis of attacking or otherwise in-
flicting injury "on the objects of his uncontrolled or uncontrollable 
desires." 9 This requirement replaces one that there be a likelihood 
of attack or infliction of injury, degradation, pain or other evil on 
prospective victims.lO 
It has already been pointed out that a determination of sexual dan-
gerousness may be made concerning persons convicted of sex offenses, 
those incarcerated for any offense, and juveniles in the custody of the 
Youth Service Board. The statute provides two adjudicating pro-
cedures, one for the first category and another for the second and 
third. 
a. Persons convicted of sex offenses. If it appears to a District Court 
judge that a person charged with commission of one of the listed sex 
offenses11 is guilty and appears to be a sexually dangerous person then 
the case must be sent to the Superior Court.12 Once a conviction has 
been had in the Superior Court the new act continues the provisions 
giving the Superior Court authority to commit the offender to a "treat-
ment center" for no more than sixty days before the court imposes 
sentence.13 The commitment is for psychiatric examination, diag-
nosis and recommendation as to disposition.14 
The actual declaration of status as a sexually dangerous person takes 
place only after an adversary proceeding in the Superior Court based 
9 Acts of 1958. c. 646. §l. 
10 Acts of 1954. c. 686, §l. 
11 See note 2 supra. 
12 Acts of 1958. c. 646. §3. 
13 Id. §4. At several points the new statute refers to the treatment center or a 
branch thereof. e.g .• id. §5. These branches are authorized in Section 2. However. 
Acts of 1959. c. 615. amends Section 2 so as to remove the authorization for branches. 
It seems. therefore. that all other references to branches of the treatment center in 
the new sexually dangerous persons law are impliedly repealed. Legislation making 
the repeal explicit would be desirable. 
14 This provision drops reference to "special treatment" during this initial com-
mitment as it was found in Acts of 1954. c. 686. §1. as amended by Acts of 1957. c. 
772. §2. 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1959 [1959], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1959/iss1/14
98 1959 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §lO.3 
upon a psychiatric report from the center that the offender is sexually 
dangerous. This differs markedly from the former act which provided 
for imposition of a traditional sentence and commitment to the treat-
ment center as a matter of course following a psychiatric report placing 
the offender within the statute.15 In the hearing the offender is en-
titled to compulsory attendance of witnesses in his behalf and to have 
the court appoint counsel for him if that is necessary to protect his 
rights. No mention is made of who pays counsel, or if he is to be paid 
at all. The psychiatric report is admissible in evidence, although 
there is no requirement that it be introduced or that the judge's find-
ing be based upon it. This leaves unanswered the vital question of 
the offender's right to a copy of this all-important document. 
If the offender is found by the court to be sexually dangerous it may, 
in lieu of a traditional sentence, commit the offender to the treatment 
center for an indeterminate life sentence,16 This was authorized in 
the former act,17 A significant change, however, is found in the grant 
of discretion to the court to place the offender on probation. One 
effect of this grant would seem to be an implied repeal of the manda-
tory five-year prison term for adult offenders twice convicted of forcible 
rape of a child under the age of sixteen or of unnatural and lascivious 
acts with a child under the age of sixteen.lS It must be remembered, 
however, that the authority to grant probation is conditioned upon a 
finding of sexual dangerousness. Thus there is the anomalous situa-
tion whereby a person convicted of either of these two offenses a second 
time must go to prison for at least five years if he is not sexually dan-
gerous but may be given supervised liberty if he is sexually dangerous. 
b. Persons serving a sentence or in the custody of the Youth Service 
Board. If it appears to the custodian of such a person that he is sexu-
ally dangerous the custodian may initiate an investigation culminating 
in a Superior Court commitment hearing if there is a corroborating 
psychiatric finding of sexual dangerousness,19 In the absence of such 
a finding the person must be returned to his prior status even before 
the case reaches the Superior Court hearing. The hearing is con-
ducted in the manner provided for in the case of convicted sex of-
15 Under the old law, however, the offender could obtain a hearing on the report 
by appealing to the Superior Court. Acts of 1954, c. 686, §1, as amended by Acts of 
1957, c. 772, §3. 
16 Acts of 1958, c. 646, §5. 
17 Acts of 1954, c. 686, §l, as amended by Acts of 1957, c. 772, §6. 
IS These offenses were created by Sections 2 and 4 of Chapter 763 of the Acts of 
1955. This statute also created the crime of assaulting a female child under the age 
of sixteen with intent to commit ra,pe. Id. §3. Section 1 was an amendment to the 
parole laws, G.L., c. 276, §87, as amended by Acts of 1941, c. 264, §2, purporting to 
remove these three new offenses from eligibility for parole until after five years of im· 
prisonment had been served. This amendment, however, does not refer to the 
offense created by Section 3; the cross reference is to Section 24A of G.L., c. 265 
(dealing with venue for the trial of certain offenses), instead of to Section 24B (the 
new offense created by Acts of 1955, c. 763, §3). This defect appears not to have 
been noticed in the discussion of the 1955 act in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.21. 
19 Acts of 1958, c. 646, §6. 
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fenders. That this does not, however, include appointment of counsel 
is indicated by the provision that relatives or friends be informed if 
the person charged "is incapable of conducting his contest to the 
report" and that a guardian ad litem may be appointed to protect his 
interests.20 Another difference is that the court has authority to com-
mit a sexually dangerous person from this group to a mental insti-
tution, an alternative not av~ilable when the sexually dangerous person 
has merely committed a sex offense. Otherwise, the consequences of 
being sexually dangerous are the same for both groups. 
Release from commitment as a sexually dangerous person. The 
most important change in the new act relates to a provision for parole 
from the treatment center.21 The use of supervised liberty appears 
to be a wise addition to a flexible and individualized program. There 
are, however, potential dangers to be noted. The supervision of liberty 
may last for the rest of the person's natural life. It is questionable, 
however, that sexual dangerousness persists this long. A provision 
requiring complete liberty at the age of sixty-five would be a proper 
addition to the statutory plan. The act also provides that the parole 
permit becomes automatically void upon the violation of any law of 
the Commonwealth.22 If all of the laws of the Commonwealth were 
conceived and drawn in such a way that there could be some assurance 
that those who violate them represent some degree of menace to the 
general security then this voiding provision would be proper. It is 
perfectly clear, however, that this is not the case and that many crim-
inal acts bear no relation at all to the safety of the Commonwealth. 
For example, why should a person be subject to additional treatment 
as a sexually dangerous person for having committed the crime of 
pulling up a wild azalea?28 
§10.4. Eavesdropping. Significant legislative changes in the crime 
of eavesdropping have been made during the 1959 SURVEY year. The 
new legislation1 affects both the elements of the offense and the means 
of obtaining immunity from the statute for law enforcement officers. 
The former statute proscribed secretly overhearing conversations 
within a building with the aid of mechanical devices or a telephone 
wire tap, provided this was done with an intent to procure official 
information or to injure someone.2 The 1959 version of eavesdrop-
ping modifies each of these elements. There must now be secret over-
hearing without the consent of one of the parties to the conversation. 
"Within a building" has been replaced by "at any place," so that the 
crime may be committed anywhere. The proscribed method of eaves-
dropping is described as "using any electronic recording device, or a 
20 Ibid. 
21 Id. §9. 
22 Ibid. 
lIS It is a crime to pull up any more of a wild azalea than is necessary to procure 
the flower. G.L., c. 266, §1l6A. 
§10.4. 1 Acts of 1959, c. 449. 
2 Acts of 1920, c. 558, §l. 
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wireless tap or electronic tap, or however otherwise described, or any 
similar device or arrangement or by tapping any wire." 3 This de-
scription would presumably include the mechanical devices mentioned 
in the superseded statute. 
The most significant change in the elements of the offense, however, 
is the elimination of the requirement of intent. No state of mind 
is mentioned in the new statute. Its impact, therefore, is immensely 
broader than that of its predecessor. By operation of this statute all 
persons are criminals who secretly overhear conversations of others re-
gardless of the purpose of the overhearing, or even if it is done with 
no particular purpose - merely from curiosity. Judicial interpreta-
tion may lessen the seeming harshness of the act. If "secretly" is taken 
to include a malicious element then an intent to injure may be im-
ported back into the statute. Or, merely overhearing without some 
electronic or mechanical aid may be held to fall outside the statutory 
proscription. Unless some such restrictions are operative it seems that 
many, many persons are criminals who present no serious threat to the 
well.being of the community and as to whom the criminal stigma would 
be wholly unjustified. 
Both the present and the earlier statutes contain exceptions whereby 
eavesdropping is permitted under certain conditions. Under the 
earlier act immunity could be conferred by the written permission of 
the Attorney General or the district attorney "for the district." 4 Cur-
rently, immunity from criminality is dispensed by "any justice of the 
Supreme Judicial Court or Superior Court." The earlier act contained 
no legislative policy as to when the permission was to be granted. 
Discretion was completely uncontrolled and unguided. The present 
law, on the other hand, makes permission to eavesdrop turn on a 
judicial finding that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evi-
dence of crime may be obtained by eavesdropping. The Supreme 
Judicial Court has advised that this judicial participation in the law 
enforcement process is constitutionally proper.5 This control on dis-
cretion is partly diluted, however, by the provision that the person 
to be overheard and the line to be tapped need not be known in order 
for the judicial permission to issue. 
The new statute contains a curious provision that a decision grant-
ing exemption from the proscription is not subject to review. The 
whole purpose of official eavesdropping would be defeated if the 
application were made in an adversary proceeding. If these are ex 
parte proceedings, as they must be, then who is there to seek review 
if the moving party (the law enforcement official) obtains the relief 
for which he prays? By implication, this provision denying review 
when exemption is granted may authorize review when it is denied. 
A more clear and direct statement of such an authorization would be 
desirable. 
3 Acts of 1959, c. 449, §l. 
4 Acts of 1920, c. 558, §l. 
Ii Opinion of the Justices, 336 Mass. 765, 142 N.E.2d 770 (1957). 
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Section 2 of the new statute is directed against those who, for the 
purpose of eavesdropping, permit or acquiesce in the installation of an 
eavesdropping device. This is not punishable, however, when au-
thorized under the provisions discussed above. A problem arises from 
the fact that there is nothing in these provisions authorizing this kind 
of activity. Those who actually do the eavesdropping may be author-
ized; but nothing is said of those, such as superintendents or land-
owners, who must permit or acquiesce in installation of equipment. 
Perhaps the statute is to be read as meaning that permission for one 
is permission for all. Here too, a clear and direct statement of policy 
would be desirable. 
§lO.5. Support of needy disabled children. The Uniform Deser-
tion and Non-Support Act provides that "any ... father who unrea-
sonably neglects or refuses to provide for the support and maintenance 
of . . . his minor child . . . and any mother who . . . wilfully neg-
lects or refuses to provide for the support and maintenance of her 
child under the age of sixteen" are subject to criminal penalties.1 
The duty imposed under this act has been supplemented and expanded 
by a criminal statute enacted during the 1959 SURVEY year.2 The new 
act applies the duty of support without regard to the age of the child, 
provided he is needy and disabled. In such a case the parent must 
not "unreasonably neglect or refuse to provide for the support and 
maintenance" of the child. The penalty is a maximum of two years 
of imprisonment or a $500 fine, or both. 
§lO.6. Corrupt payments in labor relations. Early in the 1959 
SURVEY year a criminal statute was enacted proscribing certain im-
proper payments.1 The scheme of the statute is to make two separate 
prohibitions. The first makes it illegal for designated employer per-
sonnel to pay, deliver, or agree to payor deliver money or any other 
thing of value to an employee or group of employees.2 The second 
imposes criminality on the employee or labor union official who solicits 
or accepts the forbidden payment. In both cases the solicitation, pay-
ment, delivery or agreement must be for the purpose of influencing 
employees in exercising their rights to organize or to select a representa-
tive or for the purpose of hindering the existence or functioning of a 
labor organization. 
An imbalance in liability is apparent in the situation where a pay-
ment is made to a labor union official. If the illegal statutory purpose 
. is present the activity of the official is always criminal. This is the 
effect of the second prohibition. But the employer-party to such a 
payment is criminally liable only if the union official is an employee; 
the management liability is limited to situations in which the corrupt 
arrangement is made with employees. 
§1O.5. 1 G.L., c. 27lJ, §1. 
2 Acts of 1959, c. 402. 
§10.6. 1 Acts of 1958, c. 678. 
2 The act contains certain exceptions to permit such things as payment of wages 
to employees or of withheld union dues to the labor organization. 
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B. DECISIONS 
§lO.7. Proceedings against delinquents. Violations of the crimi-
nal law by children between the ages of seven and seventeen are prose-
cuted in special juvenile hearings, unless the offense is first-degree 
murder.1 The Superior Court has jurisdiction to conduct a regular 
criminal trial for this offense. The court 2 conducting the juvenile 
hearing may terminate the proceeding and order the child to be tried 
in the traditional criminal manner, provided the child is between the 
ages of fourteen and seventeen and the court determines that the 
child~s welfare and the public interest require such a trial.s By im-
plication, children under the age of fourteen must remain before the 
juvenile court. 
In Metcalf v. Commonwealth4 the Supreme Judicial Court decided 
two questions of first impression in Massachusetts which arose under 
this system of adjudicating juvenile offenses. Reginald Metcalf was 
indicted for first-degree murder, being fourteen years old at the 
time the indictment was returned. He had been thirteen years old 
at the time of the killing which was the subject of the indictment. In 
the Superior Court, Metcalf pleaded guilty to second-degree murder 
and was thereupon sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed to the 
Supreme Judicial Court, claiming (1) that the Superior Court lost 
jurisdiction over him when it had been determined that he had not 
committed first-degree murder, the court's acceptance of his plea being 
such a determination, and (2) that he should have been remanded to 
the juvenile court which would have to treat him as a delinquent 
child under the age of fourteen since it is age at the time of the com-
mission of the offense which determines whether there is discretion 
in the juvenile court to order him tried in a criminal proceeding. 
The Commonwealth contended that once the jurisdiction of the Su-
perior Court attached, it was not defeated by the plea to second-degree 
murder and that discretion would exist in the juvenile court to send 
Metcalf to the Superior Court since it is age at the time of the indict-
ment that establishes this discretion. 
The Supreme Judicial Court decided both questions in Metcalf's 
favor. Other states that have passed on similar questions arising under 
their own juvenile offender laws have been divided on the answers 
reached.5 
The continuation or loss of jurisdiction by the Superior Court is 
highly important since upon it turns the question of whether that 
court or the juvenile court passes sentence. The latter court does not 
possess the authority to order imprisonment and it is, therefore, more 
§1O.7. 1 G.L., c. 119, §§52, 54. 
2 The Boston Juvenile Court or a District Court, except the Municipal Court 
of Boston. 
<I G.L., c. 119, §61. 
4338 Mass. 648, 156 N.E.2d 649 (1959). 
5 See 338 Mass. at 653 n.l, 656, 156 N.E.2d at 651 n.l, 654. 
:~-. -------------
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in keeping with the legislative scheme of withholding harsh punish-
ments from children to hold as the Supreme Judicial Court did on 
the first question. A second reason supporting the decision divesting 
the Superior Court of sentencing jurisdiction relates to the experience 
of the juvenile courts in dealing with youthful offenders. It is patently 
best, both for the child and for the public, that advantage be taken of 
this experience as frequently as is consistent with legislative require-
ments. 
It may be suggested, however, that this question never should have 
been permitted to arise. The first-degree murder exception to the 
youthful offender statute is largely without merit. Underlying the 
exception is an assumption that children who commit first-degree mur-
der are different in some meaningful aspect from those who commit 
second-degree murder or manslaughter. The distinctions among these 
grades of criminal homicide, however, are highly technical, turning on 
the existence of such mystical elements as deliberate and premeditated 
malice aforethought.6 Legislative reconsideration might indicate that 
the public interest would be advanced by including all delinquent 
offenders in the statutory scheme. 
As to the second question presented in the Metcalf case, the wisdom 
of the Supreme Judicial Court's decision is not so clear. The opinion 
relies heavily upon the language of G.L., c. 119, §61, "If it be alleged 
. . . that a child between fourteen and seventeen years of age has com-
mitted [Court's emphasis] an offense against a law of the common~ 
wealth," as indicating that the age at the time of the offense is crucial. 
As a strict matter of the contexual meaning of the words, the Court's 
reading is not the only reasonable interpretation. The Court reads 
the statute as meaning "a child between fourteen and seventeen who 
has committed an offense while between fourteen and seventeen." It 
would also be reasonable to read it as describing a child fourteen to 
seventeen years old who has committed an offense at any time. It 
appears, therefore, that the Court was not foreclosed from finding that 
juvenile court discretion exists regardless of when the offense was com-
mitted. The Court's decision, in effect, announces an additional con-
dition for the exercise of juvenile court discretion to order a fourteen-
to seventeen-year-old child tried as an adult. The condition is that 
the offense must have been committed after the age of fourteen has 
been reached. Justification for thus limiting the juvenile court's dis-
cretion seems to be lacking. The same considerations, e.g., a need 
for the regimented life of a prison, that would persuade the juvenile 
court to order an adult trial for an offense committed at the age of 
fifteen may be present when the offense was committed at the age 
of thirteen. 
§IO.8. Rape: Fraud. General Laws, c. 265, §22 provides that 
"Whoever ravishes and carnally knows a female by force and against 
her will shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 
6 See Cardozo, What Medicine Can Do for Law, in Selected Writings of Benjamin 
Nathan Cardozo 382-384 (HaIL ed. 1947). 
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life or for any term of years." It has been held that "against her will" 
means "without her consent" so that it is a violation of the statute to 
have relations with a woman who is so drunk as to be unconscious 
and thereby incapable of consenting.1 In Commonwealth v. Golden-
berg2 the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed another conviction for 
rape where the use of force was not an element. 
The defendant, a physiotherapist, had been treating a pregnant 
nineteen-year-old girl in an attempt to produce a miscarriage. In the 
course of his treatment he induced her to consent to the intercourse 
with him by telling her that it was a part of the treatment and that "it 
would help in some way." The Court reversed the conviction for 
rape under these circumstances. 
This was the first time the question of fraudulently induced consent 
has been considered in a Massachusetts rape case. In other states in 
which the problem has arisen the effect of the fraud on the liability 
for rape depends upon what the fraud relates to. If there is fraud 
or deception as to the act itself (fraud in the factum), as where the 
woman is induced to believe that she will be treated with surgical 
instruments, the consent is not effective and the liability is upheld.3 
But if the fraud relates to some other matter and the woman is aware 
that she is consenting to an act of intercourse (fraud in the induce-
ment) then the consent will be a bar to liability.4 
The decision in the Goldenberg case is based upon the refusal to 
accept fraud as a substitute for force. The opinion makes no refer-
ence to the fact that this case involves fraud in the inducement and 
not fraud in the factum. Whether this case is authority for an out-
right rejection of fraud or merely follows the distinction made out-
side Massachusetts cannot be known until a case involving fraud in 
the factum comes before the Court. 
§lO.9. Statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for crimi-
nal actions serves both individual and community purposes. For the 
individual it provides assurance that experiences in the distant past 
will not be made the basis of accusations which neither memory nor 
evidence can satisfactorily refute. For the community the time limita-
tion forms a part of the procedural structure designed to promote fair 
trials and to mitigate the risk of convicting innocent persons. That 
statutes limiting prosecutions in criminal cases are viewed solely as 
benefits conferred on the criminal class, however, is indicated from 
the common structure of the statutes which vary the period of limita-
tions according to the seriousness of the crime.1 Further evidence 
of the same limited view is found in the provision that the statute is 
§1O.8. 1 Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 7 Am. Rep. 531 (1870). 
2338 Mass. 377, 155 N.E.2d 187 (1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001 (1959). 
3 Pomeroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96 (1883). 
4 Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356 (1872). The Supreme Judicial Court in the 
Goldenberg case noted and agreed with the decision and reasoning of this case. 
1959 Mass. Adv. Sh. 129, 134, 155 N.E.2d 187, 191. 
§1O.9. 1 See, e.g., G.L., c. 277, §63. 
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tolled during the time when the person charged makes it especially 
difficult for enforcement officials to find him. Under the Massachusetts 
statute the defendant must reside "usually and publicly" within the 
Commonwealth in order for the statute to continue running.2 Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1959 SURVEY year 
has also neglected the fact that the statute of limitations is an integral 
part of criminal procedure designed to insure a maximum of fairness 
and general security. 
In Couture v. Commonwealths the Court interpreted the tolling 
provision of the Massachusetts statute. The defendant was tried for 
offenses committed in September, 1942, on an indictment returned 
in December, 1951. One week after the offenses were committed the 
defendant was taken at night from his home in Taunton, Massa-
chusetts, by police from Providence, Rhode Island. They had no 
warrant for his arrest and took him to the Taunton police station. 
Later that night he was taken from the police station to Rhode Island 
where he was tried and imprisoned "during the greater part" 4 of the 
time between 1942 and 1951. The offenses for which Couture was 
tried in 1951 would be barred from prosecution unless the statute was 
tolled during his Rhode Island incarceration. The Supreme Judicial 
Court decided that the statute was tolled in spite of the circumstances 
of Couture's removal from the Commonwealth. 
The opinion does not expressly say so, but there is little doubt that 
it was wrong to arrest Couture without a warrant and to permit him 
to be taken out of the Commonwealth other than by the means pro-
vided by law. Both Massachusetts and Rhode Island have adopted 
the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.5 In view of this it would seem 
that a minimum obligation of the government to the citizen is to pro-
tect him from illegal seizure and see to it that his most basic legal 
rights are not denied him. In the Couture case the Court had an 
opportunity to recognize this obligation and to motivate the police 
to do likewise by denying to the government the fruits of its own 
failure to protect the defendant. By deciding that the statute was 
tolled the Court condones the procedure to which Couture was sub-
jected. The Court noted that there was not sufficient participation 
by the Commonwealth to raise this question of fairness.6 It is sug-
gested, however, that there was sufficient neglect of the Common-
wealth's duty to require a ruling on the fairness of the whole course 
of events. 
2 Ibid. 
S 338 Mass. 31, 153 N.E.2d 625 (1958). 
4338 Mass. at 32, 153 N.E.2d at 627. 
5 G.L., c. 276, §§1l·20R; R.I. Gen. Laws §§12·9·1 to 12·9·35 (1956). 
6338 Mass. 31, 35, 153 N.E.2d 625, 628·629 (1958). 
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